1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 { MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

122 and took the time to serve on my dissertation committee; Dr. Alan Merriam, of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology, served on my dissertation committee, and showed a sincere interest in my future; Dr. Harold Driver and Dr. John Messenger, both of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology.

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000 I owe a great and special debt of gratitude to Dr. John Kennedy, of the Neuro-Psychiatric Institute of U.C.L.A., who served as my adviser during a two-year stay in Egypt. He, more than any other, has influenced by own approach to anthropology. I am glad to have this opportunity to thank him for being a good friend and a brilliant teacher.

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122 During the course of my graduate training, my fieldwork

121 functions." The political system as a structure with reference
*613 to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective
121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
• [128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
184 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

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the central value and traditional institution of 'aqila which has always existed and is still binding. All authority is referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of 'aqila which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate interests, political action, or the exercise of authority and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of

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the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have touched on what gives structure and meaning to political action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating through the office of 'aqila deals with both an internal and an external system of political relations, a corporate group and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

*613 554 [596] The role of 'aqila is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the shaib (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The 'aqila represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

*613 554 571 The role of 'aqila is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary bait has its own 'aqila. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political structure of the lineage. In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The 'aqila acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

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*613 571 681 628 626 671 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the 'awaiyid, or law of the Bedouins.

Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the *613 571 578 function of the 'awaaqil who act as legitimate representatives in terms of the rawaabit, and as legitimate judges and decision-makers in terms of the 'awaiyid. Not all conflict in the external political system is, in terms of our structural levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political 619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is *613 571 578 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kmailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

*128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

67 I checked the contents of this document with 201
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and represented the 'awaiyid as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the 'awaiyid refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
•[128] diiya. The case studies which I present below reflect the 'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full diiya is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The diiya for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full diiya will be due.

578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the nazaala, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an 'aqila, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's bait to the residence of the protecting group for

external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diiya and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse the diiya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms of social control and dispute settlement. A political office exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range of political action, and the process of adjudication and compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about

what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into those involving personal injury and those concerning property rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

Two cases of killing have been discussed previously. Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which occurred in the external political system at the various levels of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe; the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases. The third case presented below is a translation of an actual document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

554 571 556 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 571 627 *613 One most important way of accruing "status honor" in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict situations. The role of the third party represents an effective and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the [718] office of 'aqila. For instance, by mediating through the process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds.

[114] •[128] [1]This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 571 627 *613 [182] politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the role of 'aqila, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 591 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of 'aqila differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following [128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it 554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political 571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally 627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority *[613] structure being divided between the 'aqila and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The [792] exception to this is the rajal saalih who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 571 182 *[613] When power is institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

• [128]

554 571 *613 627 When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

554 571 and operate as a rajal khair.

There are two primary types of political roles in al-Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal political roles have been decreed from above by the government. The traditional roles of 'aqila and "third party" represent autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of 'aqila is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of 'umda and shaikh are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office" (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is demanded are not those espoused by the 'aqila or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

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•128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

• 128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the 'aqila has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the 'aqila in the form of the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a rajal khair when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a rajal khair agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a rajal khair can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the rajal khair may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

* (613) A person occupying the office of 'aqila can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a rajal khair. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 178 [792] you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

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Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [179] The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the [571] [635]

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CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

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In this study I have attempted to understand and to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary assumption of the study has been that political analysis must proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon, the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process. This study has dealt with the structure and function of authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights and obligations obtaining between individuals which is expressed through a structure of social roles. At another level of social organization, the rights and obligations inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and to underline the organizational principles from which the Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first
121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of culture change now occurring through the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr. The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move towards political integration into the larger Egyptian society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships based upon private landholding, individual competitive participation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical experiences and ecological factors, social structure and social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases, it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

128 concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us
105 to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us
121 to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin authority structure and its place in the economic transformation of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that, in the future, access to political roles will become a matter of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with the political aspect of traditional roles and structures, the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This applies to economic as well as political structures, as the first part of this study is intended to show. But among the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms of both community and family organization . . . (because) the life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

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121 Authority represents and maintains a legitimate political order and an allotment of power. Without a system of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of 'aqila was claimed to be the

•128 basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To
105 a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr
121 is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference to traditional principles of organization for the regulation of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of 'aqila
121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of 'aqila, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.
105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of which tell us something about kinship structure: in one way authority is the property of relations which obtain between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define the structural boundaries and to secure the structural continuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the lineage structure and represented by the office of 'aqila. In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis other groups and acts to promote political order in society. Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as operating at the various levels of the lineage structure, i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and roles which characterize authority and political action at these various levels. One role, the shaib, which functions solely at the familial level of the authority structure was described; the fully institutionalized authority role of 'aqila was analyzed as were a number of only partly institutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of these power roles was seen to be that of the rajal khair. The institutionalized roles, and this includes the shaib or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 according to public expectational patterns while the non-
121 institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged
105 upon by structural norms, could function outside these patterns. This distinction between types of roles was seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipulate persons and events in a play for power. These three levels of authority were factored out from one another solely for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used in this study, I consider one of the most important methods available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political, or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or absence of this role; hence the whole political structure proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila, and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

128 sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and
121 the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honor-
105 ing of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract, residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony. The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law, a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20), known as the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was described and a number of case studies occurring at the various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

128 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the
121 Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally.
105 A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins, to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was developed in this study. It was pointed out that in the case of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the rajal khair or the rajal salih who usually becomes involved, and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge. This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves make between the roles of arbiter-'aqila and mediator-"third party." This differentiation between political roles is equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

128 between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former
121 category included the 'aqila, the rajal khair, and rajal salih,
105 while the latter was made up of the 'umda and the shaikh. The roles of 'umda and shaikh have been historically imposed upon the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and, to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a "cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic, and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority, all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

128 to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the 121 present and future of al-Qasr. 105

Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure,

128 121 105 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The need for central coordination and cooperation with national governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new cultural responses and devices which result in novel and creative internal reorganization and reintegration around new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj 'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns. Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker" role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the family level to the total societal level. Politics involves the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality, in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr, and in every human society, property is not the singular prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy man" and the prospective 'aqila of Bait Braik, that authority is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and
121 is related to an unequal distribution of authority between
105 individuals and groups, and the important point is that this is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society, the threat to the traditional distribution of power and authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional patterns of conflict and political structures provide meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails a higher differentiation in the political structure. And, as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups, such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI
OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

121
128
[671] The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled within a tribal society with no contralized authority. One way these disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special
[Introductory, P. V]

121 attention is paid to the nature of political leadership; the domains
128 within which the leaders function, the bases of their political support and how all these are related to their role in dispute settlement.

Through the analysis of cases some of the salient features of the process of judicial reasoning are examined in the remaining part of the thesis. Distinction is made here between cases involving personal injuries and those arising from contractual relationships.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study.

[Introductory, P. Vi]
[P. i is blank]

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the
428 position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigid-
178 ity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selec-
613 tion have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the
128 selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred during my stay in the area.

613 Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its
[423] place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not
[613] baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists
[594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In
[595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with
[361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

628 613 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 554 157 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila, they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it. The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves, some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they operate at a given point, were revealed.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

PREFACE

THIS account of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica would not have been written if a number of accidents had not led me to their country during the late war, but the seed of it was planted long before the war. I had acquired during three years' residence in Egypt and through travels in other Arab lands some knowledge of Arab history and culture, a little experience of Bedouin, and proficiency in spoken Arabic. During the war a year spent as Political Officer in the Alawite Territory of Syria added to both knowledge and enthusiasm. I had been acquainted with some of the Sanusi exiles in Egypt as far back as 1932 and had visited Darna and Banghazi by sea; and it had long been my hope that I might some day, when the Italians had ceased to rule the country, have a chance to visit the interior. This wish came true when in November 1942 I was posted as Political Officer to the (third) British Military Administration of Cyrenaica. I spent over two years in the country, the greater part of them among the Bedouin, particularly the more nomadic sections. Inhabited Cyrenaica is a small country and as in the course of my wanderings, mostly in its southern steppes and the desert beyond them, I covered more than two thousand miles by horse and camel I came to know something of its Bedouin tribes. My duties, it is true, prevented me from carrying out any systematic inquiries of a sociological kind, but the contact with the Bedouin they entailed enabled me to read the literature which forms the basis of this study in the light of my own experience. My labours have been but a small return for the hospitality of the tents and the many kindnesses of my Bedouin hosts.

I have not attempted to write a history of Cyrenaica, but only of the development of the Sanusiya Order among the Bedouin tribes of the country. I have, therefore, said nothing of the centuries of Greek colonization and Roman and Byzantine rule, nor of the little known centuries of Arab and Turkish rule until 1843, when the Grand Sanusi founded his first zawiya, or religious lodge, on the Cyrenaican plateau. Also, I have not aimed at giving a comprehensive account either of the Sanusiya Order or of the Bedouin tribes, but I have described both only in so far as seemed necessary to an understanding of the political

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

128 development of the Order which sprang from their association. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, and elsewhere, are so called because they adhere to the Islamic Order of the Sanusiya which takes its name from its founder al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi and has been directed by his descendants. I have, therefore, described briefly the nature of an Islamic Order and how this particular Order became established and spread. The Sanusiya differs from most other Orders not so much in its teachings and rites as in its political and economic organization, a development arising from its absorption into the Bedouin tribal structure, but owing much also to opposition from the outside, particularly to the Italo-Sanusi wars. For this reason I have described in the latter part of the book Italo-Sanusi relations at some length. If in doing so I have sometimes expressed indignation, I do not wish it to be thought that I have any but friendly feelings for Italy and her people, or that I believe the Italian colonial record to be very different from the records of other Colonial Powers.

104 128 I have transliterated Arabic words in the simplest way. The Arabist will know, or can easily discover, how they are written in Arabic, and those who do not know the language would be little the wiser had I transliterated them differently. For the uninitiated it need only be said that the letter 'q', which stands for the Arabic letter *qaf*, has in Cyrenaica the value of a hard 'g' as in the English word 'goat', that 'gh', which stands for the Arabic letter *ghain*, has the value the Parisian gives to the 'r' in 'Paris', and that ', which stands for the Arabic letter *'ain*, is a guttural sound peculiar to Arabic. I have not been entirely consistent in the spelling of Arabic words in that I have retained the usual English spelling of such words as Cairo, Mecca, Kufra, Caramanli, and Koran, and that I have treated some Arabic words as though they were English words and have, therefore, not italicized them and have given them the common English plural form, e.g. Shaikhs, qadis, Sharifs, mudirs, and zawiyas. I have used the Arabic names of places instead of classical or Italian names: Shahhat, Marsa Susa, and al-Marj instead of Cirene, Apollonia, and Barce. If I need to excuse myself for this on the grounds that Cyrenaica is to-day an Arab country, no apology is needed for using the Arab names for the sites of recently built Italian colonial settlements, in naming

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

which the Italians commemorated persons who for the most part might well be forgotten. To aid the reader I have listed at the end of the book the chief place-names mentioned in the text with their Italian equivalents. It will be observed that the Italian way of writing Arabic words is different from our way: where we write Suluq, Tubruq, Banghazi, and Jaghbub, they write Soluch, Tobruch, Bengasi, and Giarabub.

I have cut the book to half its original size and have consequently been compelled to omit a mass of detail. I have also restricted references to quotations and to statements which seem particularly to require the citation of an authority. Much of the omitted detail and many of the deleted references will be found in various articles and papers I have published on the Sanusi elsewhere. In a few instances I have not been able to check references because the books cited are unobtainable in England.

I acknowledge the generous help of many British and Arab friends, especially of Major-General D. C. Cumming, Muhammad Shafiq Effendi Hamza, and the warm-hearted companion of my travels Salih bu 'Abd al-Salam.

I thank Mr. E. L. Peters and Miss Sonya Gregory for help in preparation of the maps.

E. E. E.-P.

OXFORD
April 1948

[P. vi is blank]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

the lodges were largely autonomous, or came under the control of a local Mother Lodge, such as Mizda in Tripolitania and Abu Qubais in Arabia. After the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, a member of the Sanusi family sometimes installed himself as local director of the affairs of the Order, as Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid did in Fazzan. Without going into further detail it may be said that though central control existed it was cumbersome and that though there was an organization it was inadequate to deal with situations such as that which faced the Order on the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, which demanded a rapid marshalling of its dispersed resources.

V

The dynastic situation which had formed after the death of the Grand Sanusi formed again after the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi: his surviving sons, Sayyid Muhammad Idris and Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida, were minors. The leadership of the Order therefore passed to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, son of Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, Sayyid al-Mahdi's younger brother; though for the first few years its political direction seems to have been largely in the hands of the experienced old Shaikh Ahmad al-Rifi, the last of the intimates of the Grand Sanusi and the principal adviser of Sayyid al-Mahdi.

Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's leadership of the Order falls into three periods, from 1902 to 1912 when he was resisting the French in the Sahara, from 1912 to 1918 when he was in Cyrenaica directing the Bedouin against the Italians and the British, and from 1918, when he went into exile, to 1933, the year of his death at al-Madina in Arabia. It is only the second period with which this book is directly concerned and I will therefore summarize very briefly the events in the Sahara, leaving to a future chapter a more detailed account of the events in Libya which led to the Sayyid's appearance in Cyrenaica at the head of the Sanusiya Militant.

The French advance continued. After the loss of Bir Alali in 1902 Sayyid Ahmad moved his headquarters from Qiru back to Kufra, where he was protected by an immense desert and diplomatic immunity, since the British took the view that the oasis belonged to Turkey. In 1906 the French took Kawar and

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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Bilma and in the following year occupied 'Ain Kalak, killing Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani, the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge there and the foremost of al-Sayyid al-Mahdi's missionaries in the Sahara. In 1909 they occupied Abaish in Wadai and sent an expedition against Masalit. As they advanced they everywhere destroyed or suppressed the lodges of the Order. In 1913 and 1914 they occupied Tibesti, Borku, Wajanqa, and Ennedi, at the same time as the Italians occupied Fazzan from Tripolitania. Though the Sanusiya had minor military successes and temporarily regained some of its territory, it had lost all political control in what is now known as the French Sudan. While the Franco-Sanusi war was in progress in the Sudan Italy, in 1911, declared war on Turkey and landed troops at various points on the Libyan coast, the conquest of Tripolitania being the primary objective. From the first the Sanusiya entered the fray and when Turkey abandoned the contest in 1912 the Order continued the struggle in its own name.

At this point I must break off my account of the history of the Order to show how it achieved its paramountcy in Cyrenaica, because the development of the Order is tied up with a certain set of social relations in Cyrenaica and has been circumscribed by them. Only in Cyrenaica did the Sanusiya in the end establish itself firmly because only there existed conditions which permitted its taking root strongly.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.29]

CHAPTER II

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

I

IN the last chapter I recorded the development of the Sanusiya. 128
In this chapter I give a brief description of Cyrenaica and of the way of life of the Bedouin who live there and an equally brief account of the history of these Bedouin and of their tribal system.

The geographical isolation of Cyrenaica proper, the large 13
peninsula which juts into the Mediterranean from the Bay of al-Sallum to the eastern Sirtica, has greatly affected its history. It is cut off from the Nile Delta by 700 km. of semi-desert and from Tripolitania by 650 km. of the Sahara round the shores of the Sirtica, while to the south of it stretch endless desert wastes, for Cyrenaica proper is only just over 200,000 sq. km. with a Saharan hinterland of over 500,000 sq. km. On the other hand the coast of Cyrenaica lies only 300 km. from Crete and 400 km. from the Greek mainland, and it belongs by climate and vegetation to Europe.

The physiographic features of the country which influence 133
to any extent the life of its people can rapidly be summarized. 137
Northern Cyrenaica is a calcareous mountain rising to a table-land, *al-Jabal al-Akhdar*, the Green Mountain, so called from its evergreen forests. To the north its slopes rise steeply from the sea or its littoral, while to the south it billows gently towards the great Saharan desert. The two major divisions of the country are known as *al-jabal*, the mountain—or *al-ghaba*, the forest, since its northern part is covered with bush—and *al-barr*, the steppe. The mountain and the steppe alike fall into 133
a number of zones, the principal of which are shown in the accompanying sketch-map. There is a narrow strip of coastal plain which broadens towards Banghazi and then spreads south-westwards into the great *barqa* plain. Animal transport can [492]
only mount the plateau from the coast by steep and infrequent paths which lead up deep ravines to the first terrace, the so-called *arqub* country, a succession of thickly wooded ridges broken into myriad bosses and cut deep by many wide wadis,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 31]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups, for the principal of which estimates are also given separately. The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the Sanusiya, is shown, likewise in relation to the distribution of Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the difference in status between free and client tribes, there were laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the whole country, and there was much coming and going between the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell, imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive organization, for there would have been no foundations in culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents, but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents, because, however interesting detail about these matters might be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this general theme.[1]

Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

[P.104]

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental, or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period of time all the segments of the society should find themselves in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself. The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

graphic settlement. Some of the richest arable lands in Cyrenaica, forming part of the endowments of the plateau lodges, were used for this purpose, and the lands of a number of other lodges came within the area marked out for future metropolitan colonization. The lands of yet other lodges lying outside this area were earmarked for Arab agricultural settlement schemes. The only Sanusiya lands which were not to be colonized were those in the less-favoured parts of the country. The date-palms and gardens of the Order in the oases were also confiscated.

As soon as the Italians had been powerful enough to seize the endowments of the Order they had seized them. Their action can only be called theft. It was a violation of the Shari'a law, repeatedly proclaimed inviolable by the Italians, and of the constitution they drew up for Cyrenaica in 1919. Their plea that the Order had opposed them in both political and military fields and had fomented rebellion in the Colony would have carried more weight if they had not seized the lands for their own nationals, for they could quite as effectively have broken the Order by using its revenues for general religious and charitable purposes. Some Italians were, indeed, troubled about such barefaced robbery, but their lawyers were able to fall back on the specious argument, so often used before to excuse similar expropriations, that the State has unlimited powers and must use them for its own safety and the welfare of the community regardless of the traditional rights of individuals and associations, and of God.

II

The elimination of the Sanusiya deprived the Bedouin of the leaders they had learned to follow but it did not make them any more favourably disposed towards the Italians. The efforts of the Administration to overcome this dull hostile turning away from their conquerors, to their acceptance of them only in resignation to the will of God, had only from 1932 to 1940 to become effective, and it was so little successful that I do not consider a detailed account of Italian native policy and measures to be required. I shall endeavour nevertheless to indicate briefly in the present section the general lines of their policy from 1911 to the entry of Italy into the last war and to illustrate its development by describing briefly in the following sections

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

the changes in the legal status of the Arabs of Cyrenaica during those years and how the lands of the Bedouin were confiscated to provide farms for Italian colonists. In the final section of the book I give a résumé of events leading up to what is, I hope, the threshold of Cyrenaican independence.

The Italians detested the Bedouin. Long years of campaigning against guerrilla bands had irritated them more than governments are usually irritated by Bedouin and made them increasingly flamboyant and brutal. In the whole Italian literature on Cyrenaica I have not read a sentence of understanding of Romany values. Because they lived in tents without most of the goods the peasant, and even more the townsman, regard as signs of civilization the Italians spoke of them as barbarians, little better than beasts, and treated them accordingly. The arguments they used to justify their treatment of them have a familiar ring.

Graziani has described the Bedouin in his usual uncompromising language and his opinions were doubtless shared by most army officers and government officials:

> 'Anarchist, lover of the most complete liberty and independence, intolerant of any restraint, headstrong, ignorant, unconquerable and boastful (*bluffista*) hero, it is sufficient that he possesses a rifle and a horse; he often masks, under the pretence of the necessity of moving his tent, the desire of gaining the end of withdrawing himself from every governmental contact and control.'

And again:

> 'Rebellious against every tie of discipline, used to wandering in territories often immense and solitary, bold in mobility and ease of movement, bemused by the fascination of independence, always ready for war and raiding, the nomads have always resisted every governmental restraint.'[1]

Graziani was a plain-spoken soldier. When the conquest phase of colonization had passed and it was no longer fashionable to believe in naked *refoulement*, administrators found it expedient to express themselves more temperately. The soldier-politician Badoglio, in his directive to subordinates in Libya for the year 1933, forbade further talk of '*ribelli*'. The war, the rebellion as it had been called, was over and the past must be forgotten in a

[1] Op. cit., pp. 119–20.

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [Libya]*[1]

In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g. Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of female names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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[1] My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953–54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin.

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.)

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert.

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

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segments show a lineage depth of three generations, while others show as many as six. No special importance is attached by the Bedouin to this number, although some writers claim that a depth of five generations is of particular significance among other Arab tribes.[7] Normally, in speaking of the vengeance group, the Bedouin refer to the name of the ancestor of a tertiary tribal section. Any one claiming membership of this group, regardless of his precise generational relation to the offender or the victim is immediately and equally involved with its other members. When speaking of the group as such, the Bedouin refer to it as 'those who have agreed on the blood', and use the phrase *'amara dam* to refer to it. Blood money does not pass between its members, and political division does not occur within it.

These small tertiary sections of tribes, then, are small residential groups. Their population varies from one group to another, but most of them have a total population of 150 to 200 souls. Successive generations—at least according to the Bedouin view—add to these numbers, and also increase progressively the number of generations in their genealogies. Substantial increases of population would, of course, constitute a pressure on local resources, on the water available in the particular well of a group, on the amount of land available for ploughing, and on the pastures for animals at the end of the rainy season. Again, if each generation is to be added to the existing genealogy, this would necessitate a realignment of structural relationships with each succeeding generation. The discussion that follows is an examination of the ways in which adjustments are made to maintain an equilibrium between the population of a group and the carrying capacity of the land on which its members live, and of the ways in which the genealogical structure is able to persist in the face of various contingencies which threaten it.

A beginning might be made by indicating the processes at work to keep the form of the genealogy fairly fixed when there is an absence of population pressure on resources. The first problem is the simple one of describing the mechanics of manipula-

[7] e.g. Burkhardt (1831) speaks of the *Khomse*, the five generation group, as very widespread among Arabs. G. W. Murray also reports the use of the word *Khomsa* among the Arabs of the Sinai desert to designate the blood-vengeance group, but the term used by the Aulad 'Ali tribe, the cousins and Egyptian neighbours of the Cyrenaican Bedouin, he gives as *Awlia'-ed-dam* (which simply means 'blood kindred').

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tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length and fixed in form despite its dynamic content.

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One of the main processes at work in foreshortening genealogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

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drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

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change their structural position only rarely. The latter change sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did not appear, and even after some questioning, what information was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation, taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown, and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

[12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is

[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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Chapter

7

*Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica**

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Marriage and the Father-Son Relationship

When a marriage takes place among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, a nuptial tent is set up some distance away from that of the groom's father. There is no particular significance about the nuptial tent itself, but it must be pitched at a distance so that the father "will not see it" — although, obviously, in a country of large level plains, it stands out conspicuously. This pretence that the tent remains unseen by the father is pushed to the point of his denying any knowledge of what is afoot. A middle-aged or elderly man with a family adopts a similar attitude to any marriage in which his son participates, as groom or as guest. An elder, the father of three unmarried sons (one of whom, in his late twenties, was known to be getting impatient about marriage), when I asked after his eldest son, insisted that he was away with the camels, although the son was conspicuous in a semicircle of young men encouraging a blindfolded maiden in the movements of her seductive dance outside a wedding tent in his full view. Prior to the wedding festivities, the

* I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. R. Werbner for reading this essay in manuscript.
The information presented is based on 27 months fieldwork carried out during 1948 to 1950, among the Cyrenaica Bedouin. I am indebted to the Trustees of the Horniman Studentship Fund, and the Committee for Treasury Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures, for making the research financially possible.

Cases

582 583 613 602 of agnation on the members of a corporate group and give it a taproot of diversity whence it derives its strength, and which makes of it "the one body," conspicuous, in comparison with other societies, as the corporate group *par excellence*.

The Sister's Son-Mother's Brother Relationship

•128 Previously the mode of relationships associated with agnation and affinity have been briefly discussed. In order to appreciate the effects of parallel-cousin marriage, some remarks concerning the sister's son-mother's brother set of relationships must be included here. Bedouin contrast the mother's 604 brother with the father's brother; their sayings and proverbs afford a [174] wealth of verbal documentation on the contrast. With the mother's brother a man enjoys all the freedoms he is denied in his relationships with his father [831] and father's brother. He is permitted to joke with him; they indulge in exchanges of obscenities. When the sister's son wishes to marry, he is permitted to discuss the matter with his mother's brother and can urge him to intercede with his father on his behalf. Two men thus related are readily recognised in the camps, because in their acts they are required to show affection by displays of innocent horseplay, pranks or mild practical jokes. Small boys pursue their mother's brother, feign to kick or strike him, and he takes it all in good part.

The external aspects of this behaviour is deceptive. Joking of this sort creates the image in which the relationships are conceived; what is equally striking in it is its compulsiveness. Obviously, mature men are not always in the mood to be teased, but if they are, they must respond appropriately. Their relationships are unmistakably onerous. This remark applies not only to the external forms of their behaviour, but also to the favours a man is [602] permitted to ask of his mother's brother. A brief amplification will make the point clear. Demands can be made of agnates, but only in situations of serious contingency. Day-to-day needs are met, not by appeals to the rights of agnation, but from the expectations linked to the mother's brother. If these expectations are withheld, the sister's son may be left in a quandary. In- 604 terestingly, in the records of homicides I gathered, three (in the con- 682 temporary population) were concerned with the killings of mother's brothers by sister's sons. Homicide within this field of relationship is difficult to comprehend unless it is appreciated that expectations are as compulsive in the daily life and the general well-being of people as are the rights and duties associated with agnation.

604 These general remarks apply to the relationships irrespective of the lineage 613 origin of the mother's brother. The similarity ends there, since the nature of the expectations, their urgency at any given moment and the kind of favours which are granted vary with the group identity of the mother's [428] brother. A mother's brother who is a member of ego's corporate group may be expected to give the sister's son small quantities of flour, favour him in all

sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

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were imminent, because the marriages of two of the men were anticipated, two others harboured more distant hopes and boys in all the tents would soon be youths. The composition of this camp, caught at a moment in time, was a function of the age and sex distribution of its inhabitants. All camps show regularities in their structure, but their content is dynamic. Certain general features persist, but the alignments of people undergo change with equal persistency. What priority is given to each of these considerations, which component occupies the nucleating centre for others, will depend on the problem under analysis, for while I have stressed that this or that is important, I do not wish to suggest that any single factor has an absolute importance compared with others, except in relation to a specific problem.

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